TRUDY RUBIN: The China strategy and larger issues

Vice President Joe Biden was busy shuttling this week from Japan to China, trying to defuse tensions over a new air-defense zone that China has set up over disputed islands in the East China Sea.

To many observers, it may have appeared that China had overreached by unilaterally declaring the zone, and that Beijing had to back down when the United States and Japan continued to send in military flights without filing the flight plans that China demanded.

But, as described in a talk by Toshi Yoshihara, a U.S. Naval War College expert on China’s maritime strategy, China’s move is part of a calculated, incremental strategy. The goal: to exert naval and air dominance over much of the Pacific, replacing American primacy.

Yoshihara’s lecture, sponsored by Philadelphia’s Foreign Policy Research Institute, was so fascinating that it’s worth a partial summary, especially since it reveals much about how China views itself and its future global role.

Everyone knows that China has become an economic superpower, but the country’s global ambitions are murkier. As a trading power, China makes heavy use of “the global commons” – sea lanes, airspace, outer space and cyberspace. “Because China has such a huge stake, you would think they’d have an interest in maintaining an open commons,” says Yoshihara. However, he adds, “We don’t have a full grasp” of China’s ambitions, or of what China wants to be when it rises to the heights of its power.

What we do know, he says, is that “the Chinese have been busy cranking out ships and submarines at a rate not expected 10 years ago.”

In part, this passion comes from China’s past, when it suffered many humiliations from seaborne invaders.

And in part the passion for sea dominance comes from Chinese geography. Chinese mariners can’t reach the high seas without passing through a series of choke points controlled by the United States or its allies.

This brings us back to Biden’s visit. The new air-defense zone that China established includes the air space above Japan’s Senkaku islands, which China claims and calls the Diaoyu islands.

While technically an air-defense zone is only supposed to give the declaring nation the right to track and monitor flights for safety and security reasons, something else is going on here. Yoshihara says Beijing’s declaration is part of a Chinese “salami strategy.” By getting international pilots to file flight plans with Beijing before flying over the Senkaku islands, China is seeking “to confer legitimacy” on its claims over the East China Sea.

Indeed, the Federal Aviation Administration quickly advised U.S. commercial airlines, for safety reasons, to comply with China’s demand. (Japanese commercial liners have refused.)

When he visited Tokyo, Biden made clear that the United States supports Japan’s claim to the islands, and that U.S. military planes will ignore the request for flight plans. But he didn’t demand that China rescind the zone, and U.S. officials don’t believe it would. Japanese officials, upset at the FAA’s quick acquiescence, held their tongues.

The real question at hand is China’s intentions. Yoshihara believes Beijing hopes to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington, while telling its own people that the United States is conceding China’s growing primacy in the region.

But the bigger question, he says, is China’s long-term aim. Does it accept free passage for all through the global common space, or will it try to exert control over the air and sea space around islands it is contesting with Japan, the Philippines, and others? The latter course would be extremely dangerous because the possibility for miscalculation is so high.

Trudy Rubin is a columnist and editorial-board member for the Philadelphia Inquirer. Readers may write to her at: Philadelphia Inquirer, P.O. Box 8263, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101, or by email at

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